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Part I: Introductory Essay
1. The aim and scope of this study
The aim of this dissertation is to provide conceptual tools for 
the social scientist for clarifying, evaluating and comparing 
explanations of social phenomena based on formal mathematical 
models. The dissertation is composed of six related but, in principle, 
independent research articles. The focus is on relatively simple 
theoretical models, not statistical models. Thus, this dissertation 
is not primarily about solving specifi cally philosophical problems, 
such as the nature of explanation or causation in general. A specifi c 
stance towards these questions is presupposed rather than directly 
argued for. It is assumed that the contrastive counterfactual theory 
of explanation and the invariance-under-interventions account of 
causation are correct, but few explicit arguments are given in favour 
of these theories. The primary condition of success for these studies 
is whether social scientists themselves can fi nd something of use in 
them - something that would, in the end, enable them to provide 
better explanations of social phenomena. Whether the theses put 
forth in these studies adhere to the intuitions of philosophers is, at 
most, a secondary issue.
The most important philosophical framework used in these 
studies is the contrastive- counterfactual theory of explanation, as 
developed by James Woodward (2003). This is especially true for 
the fi rst part of the dissertation, but the contrastive counterfactual 
theory of explanation is also used or presupposed in many of 
the arguments in the second part as well. Although few explicit 
arguments are given for this philosophical framework (for these, 
see ibid; Ylikoski 2001), it is hoped that these studies themselves 
can be seen as an argument in favour of it. The best argument for a 
philosophical theory concerning scientifi c practice is that it helps to 
improve that practice. If and when the contrastive-counterfactual 
theory of explanation helps us to elucidate actual explanations and 
explicate our implicit standards of evaluating them, then the theory 
has proven its mettle. But before the reader can assess whether this 
is indeed the case, some remarks on the place and history of models 
and explanations within the tradition of the philosophy of science as 
well as social sciences are in order. 
Society by Numbers
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The structure of this introduction is as follows. First, the 
current centrality of the concept (or, more likely, the word) ‘model’ 
in philosophy of science is placed within its historical discursive 
context. I suggest that the current abundance of model-talk is the 
result of two partially independent developments: the development 
of the semantic view of theories and the rise of the philosophies of the 
special sciences. In section 3, the questions of representation and the 
epistemic value of models are discussed and my own stances on these 
issues are also presented. Although most of the theses concerning 
model-based explanation in the articles are relatively independent 
on these issues, I feel that the reader is better off being fully aware 
of my philosophical commitments with respect to the epistemology 
and ontology of modelling. Then some remarks on the history of the 
theory of explanation are made and the contrastive-counterfactual 
theory of James Woodward is briefl y presented in section 4. In 
sections 5 and 6, the stances taken on the nature of modelling and 
explanation are brought to bear on the fundamental issues in the 
methodology of the social sciences. After this, I briefl y refl ect on the 
philosophical methodology used in this dissertation. Finally, I go 
over the main results of the articles and draw some conclusions.
2. The fall of theory and the rise of the model
The studies in this dissertation are about model-based explanations 
in the social sciences. The predicate model-based is here meant to be 
contrasted with the idea that explanations could be directly derived 
from a theory. This is not purely a terminological matter or a refl ection 
of the current indisputable model-boom in the philosophy of science. 
The studies comprising this dissertation are about explanations 
that are not simply a matter of deriving something particular from 
the more general. The explanations discussed within these pages 
essentially involve manipulating some external inferential apparatus 
- a model. 
Problems relating to the use of models currently constitute 
one of the most central areas in philosophy of science. This has not 
always been the case. There was a time when the default bearer 
of scientifi c content was taken to be the theory, and questions of 
explanation, confi rmation and realism were discussed in terms of 
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the relationships between theory, observations and the world. The 
positivist conception of the structure of scientifi c knowledge at 
the same time gave theory a central role as the locus of scientifi c 
knowledge, and denied that the content of that theory could be 
anything more than the economic re-organization of occurrent or 
even directly observable regularities. Theory was conceived as a 
(preferably axiomatizable) set of sentences couched in a theoretical 
vocabulary which was connected to observational language through 
a set of bridge principles. This was the syntactic or ‘received’ view 
of theories: The content of scientifi c knowledge is to be conceived 
as a set of propositionally structured representations anchored to 
empiria or to the world itself by analytically true correspondence 
rules or, after this view proved to be untenable, by empirical bridge 
laws (see e.g. Hempel 1965; Nagel 1961; Suppe 1977).
The philosophical developments of the 1950s and 1960s created 
diffi culties for the syntactic view, mostly because the view was 
about sentential content and was thus tied to matters of language in 
general. The idea of analytically true bridge principles was effectively 
dismantled by Quine’s critique of analyticity (1951), Hanson (1958) 
pointed out the inescapable theory-ladenness of observations, and 
it was recognized more generally that the relationship between 
theoretical content and observations was much more complicated 
than could be handled with the logical tools of the received view. 
To overcome these challenges, Patrick Suppes (1960) proposed that 
theories should be presented by directly specifying the corresponding 
classes of models, which are mathematical, not sentential, entities. 
From this suggestion grew the semantic conception, which, more 
or less, began to identify theories with classes of models, which in 
turn are understood as (uninterpreted) mathematical structures or 
trajectories in some state space (see e.g. van Fraassen 1980; Giere 
1988; Suppe 1989). Moreover, as Suppes and, later, Ronald Giere 
have emphasized, even models are usually not tested against naked 
observations, but models of data (Suppes 1962; Giere (forthcoming)). 
Thus it can be argued that the core general philosophy of science 
discourse concerning the form of scientifi c content has been turning 
to a concept of model (in a logico-mathematical sense) due to its 
internal dynamics.
Another factor in the current popularity of model-talk in the 
philosophy of science literature has been the decreasing overall 
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importance of the use of formal logical machinery and what might be 
called problems of general philosophy of science. Instead, what have 
taken the central stage are the philosophies of the special sciences, 
which address problems closer to the praxis of science. And that 
praxis is usually highly model-centred. As philosophy of science has 
become more closely aligned with the practice of science, models are 
no longer seen only as logical tools in the rational reconstruction of 
the content of science, but as important objects of theorizing. Most 
of our knowledge of evolutionary biology, ecology, psychology, 
economics and even physics can not be moulded without great 
violence to fi t the format of an axiomatizable set of universal laws. 
Instead, most actual, workable scientifi c knowledge, discounting 
the distorting simplifi cations of schoolbook or popular science, is 
packed into more local and context-dependent representations, 
built opportunistically from components available in one’s toolbox, 
from empirical hunches and purely ad hoc mathematical tricks 
as much as from generally accepted theoretical principles. These 
representations are also called models. 
In scientifi c practice, models are often seen as mediating general 
theoretical principles and empirical applications (Morrison and 
Morgan 1999). Thus, if one is interested in the relationship between 
scientifi c knowledge and the world, one should look at the practice 
of constructing and using models and, as has been noted in the 
literature, the relationship between the construction and use of these 
inferential apparatuses is always, to some extent, autonomous from 
general theoretical principles (ibid.). In fact, much of the current 
practice-oriented discussion on models criticizes the semantic view 
of linking models too closely to theories (a critique that ignores 
the differences in the aims of the proponents of the semantic view 
and the philosophers who study the praxis of model-building). 
Instead, models always incorporate, and are thus constrained 
by, factors that cannot be derived from or even argued for on the 
basis of either theory or data. Models contain context-dependent 
operationalizations, metaphors, specifi c empirical assumptions 
and mathematical techniques introduced purely for tractability. 
These ingredients mean that model-based explanations have to be 
investigated by looking at how the models are used in practice, not 




3. Doing things with models1 
Analogical and thought-experiment-like reasoning is probably as 
old as reasoning itself. Lucretius ruminated on the nature of the 
magnet on the basis of possible hypothetical mechanisms based 
on the atomic theory of matter. Gassendi conceived a molecular 
model of inheritance of ontogenic information between parents and 
offspring. Galileo reasoned about the nature of movement on the 
basis of thought-experimentation on a nonexistent frictionless plane. 
Yet the use of models as an explicit and distinct research strategy 
really gained momentum only in the nineteenth century, largely 
as a result of the need to postulate and reason about unobserved 
theoretical entities in a tractable but rigorous manner (Hesse 2000). 
The word ‘model’ originally referred primarily to concrete objects, 
like mechanical models, composed of, for example, movable bars, 
cords, wheels and rollers, or to moulds made of wax as well as 
physiological (anatomical) models made of plastic. Indeed, in his 
famous encyclopedia entry on models, Ludwig Bolzmann precludes 
maps, charts, musical notes or fi gures from categorization as 
models, since models ‘always involve a concrete spatial analogy in 
three dimensions’ (1911). Boltzmann did not require, however, that 
models should actually exist as physical objects, for they could also 
be conceived as mental constructs. 
The semantic view is a theory about the logical structure of 
all scientifi c content, but not all scientifi c practices involve explicit 
modelling. Modelling is the activity of constructing and manipulating 
a thing in order to study some other thing. What characterizes 
theoretical modelling is a certain epistemic dynamic making use of 
surrogate reasoning: one fi rst builds something or sets something 
up, then investigates the properties of that constructed thing, and 
then ponders how the discovered properties of the constructed 
thing relate to the real world. Recently, Michael Weisberg (2007) 
and Peter Godfrey-Smith (2006) have usefully articulated this 
widely held view of specifi cally model-based reasoning as the 
strategy of indirect representation. They claim that instead of directly 
abstracting some salient aspects of data or a target system into a 
workable and more systematic scientifi c representation (strategy of 
1 This section draws on Kuorikoski and Lehtinen (2009) as well as 
Knuuttila and Kuorikoski (forthcoming).
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direct representation), modellers seek to understand the real world 
through the procedure of constructing and analyzing hypothetical 
systems, in other word models. A modeller begins to attack a 
problem by coming up with a set of simple theoretical principles 
which, when combined, might be expected to solve the problem 
(such as providing an explanation for a puzzling phenomenon).
This surrogate system view captures an essential feature of 
specifi cally model-based reasoning, but taking it too literally risks 
creating (and in the philosophy of science literature has indeed 
created) an additional problem: if model-based reasoning involves 
two steps, fi rst reasoning about the properties of the model and 
then from these properties to properties of things in the world, 
just what properties of the model justify the latter inferential 
step? The syntactic view took truth or truthlikeness – a semantic 
relationship between propositionally structured representations 
and the world – to be the epistemically important property of 
scientifi c content. When models were identifi ed as non-sententially 
structured systems of representation, philosophical thought turned 
to other relationships between the model and the world that could 
possibly ‘explain’ the epistemic properties of models and provide 
grounds for the second inferential step from models to the world. A 
variety of different morphisms (isomorphism [van Fraassen 1980], 
homomorphism [Bartels 2006], partial isomorphism [French 2003]) 
have been proposed to fulfi l this role, but none have exhibited the 
right formal properties or saved all the central intuitions so as to 
be considered as ‘The’ relationship between models and the world. 
Other proposed concepts, such as similarity (Giere 1988; 2004), seem 
too vague to have much analytic or explanatory potential (Suárez 
2003). Similarity is simply a placeholder, not an actual explanatory 
factor. The same diagnosis can be made of Robert Sugden’s 
characterization (2002) of ‘credibility’ as the grounds for making the 
inductive leap from the world of models to the world itself.
Some pragmatic approaches to representation (dis)solve some 
of the problems of the semantic notion of representation mentioned 
above by the introduction of the users’ intentions, which create 
the directionality needed to establish a representative relationship 
(Giere 2004; Giere forthcoming; Mäki 2009). But this also comes at 
a price. When representation is grounded primarily on the specifi c 
goals and representing activities of humans as opposed to the facts 
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about the representative vehicle and the target object, nothing very 
substantive can be said about the relationship of representation 
in general. Another danger in stressing the intentions of the 
modellers is the conception of representation as a mental act – as if 
intentionality inside the head could magically create a relationship 
between a model and the world. This way of conceptualizing 
aboutness – conceiving intending as a special mental act that 
a-causally endows utterances with their meanings or things with 
their representational content – was identifi ed as a form of mythical 
thinking and subsequently refuted by Wittgenstein (1953). It is also 
worth avoiding in the context of models. 
Mauricio Suárez (2003; 2004) has gone farthest in arguing for a 
minimalist account of representation which resists saying anything 
substantive about the supposed basis on which the representational 
power of representative vehicles rests (that is, whether it rests, for 
instance, on isomorphism or similarity). Instead, Suárez builds his 
inferential account of representation directly on the idea of surrogate 
reasoning: i.e. the model represents something in virtue of its 
capacity to lead a ‘competent and informed user to a consideration 
of the target’, and the right kind of constitution to allow agents to 
correctly draw inferences from it correctly (Suárez 2004). While 
the aforementioned representational capacity of a model is created 
and maintained by the inferential activity of representation-users, 
the stipulation concerning the right kind of constitution saves 
the intuition that what can be a model of a certain system is not 
completely arbitrary. What kind of inferences a cognitive agent with 
certain sensory apparatus and cognitive capacities can make with the 
help of an external model-thing depends on the causal properties of 
the model-thing (see also Vorms 2009). Suárez’s account can thus be 
seen as an application of Robert Brandom’s view of representation 
in general: it is the inferential properties of objects (in relation to the 
agents using them) that constitute their representational properties 
and appealing to any primitive representational concepts to explain 
inferential properties would, therefore, put the cart before the horse 
(Brandom 1994).
Conceiving models as independent entities and construing their 
representational capacity on the basis of the kind of inferences that 
can be made with them paves the way for considering modeling 
simply as a form of extended cognition, as extended inference in 
Society by Numbers
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which the relevant cognitive unit of analysis is the user-model pair 
(or the research-community-model pair). In a paper not included 
in this dissertation, Aki Lehtinen and I (2009) denied that any 
philosophical account of representation (or of other model-world 
mappings, for that matter) can explain the epistemic value of models. 
This is because there is nothing to be explained: modelling is simply 
inference-making with the help of external cognitive aids (such as a 
formal language or a diagram). Inferring here means, roughly, using 
formal syntactic rules to derive contentful expressions from other 
contentful expressions in a truth- or probability-preserving manner. 
This means that the only epistemic questions concern the reliability 
of the assumptions and the reliability of the inferences. What sets 
modelling apart from pure thought experimentation is that in the 
former the inferences from assumptions to conclusions are not 
conducted entirely in the head of the modeller or only in natural 
language, but rather with the help of external inferential aids such 
as diagrams, mathematical formulas or computer programmes. As 
de Donato Rodriquez and Zamora-Bonilla (2009) put it, models 
function as inferential prostheses. What is doing the cognitive work 
in modelling is not the individual, but the individual-model pair. 
Modelling is essentially inference from assumptions to conclusions 
conducted by an extended cognitive system (Giere 2002; Kuorikoski and 
Lehtinen 2009).
However, as the idea of modelling as indirect representation 
makes clear, modelling certainly is distinct from ordinary inference 
and argumentation in that we seem to fi nd out genuinely new 
things by manipulating or investigating an artifi cial construct. 
The experience of discovering novel information is common to 
both modelling and experimentation. This analogy between the 
epistemic dynamics of modelling and experimentation (cf. Mäki 
2005) can be misleading, however. The sense of novelty in modelling 
is only the result of the essential use of external inferential aids. 
Using mathematics, diagrammatic reasoning carried out with pen 
and paper, or computer simulation involves manipulations of 
representations external to the mind of the human subject, and he 
or she may not experience this manipulation as inference-making, 
i.e. as something phenomenologically similar to thinking. What the 
human subject experiences is more akin to experimentation with an 
artefactual, abstract or imaginary system. The modeller manipulates 
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graphs or mathematical equations – something external to his 
or her mind – and then fi nds something new about the abstract 
object that is represented by the equations or graphs. Yet, from the 
perspective of the whole extended cognitive system consisting of 
the modeller and the external representations (the model), there 
is no experimentation, only inference. The only ‘epistemic access’ 
(cf. Mäki 2009) that the extended cognitive system has to the target 
system is via the original causal connection that was required for the 
formulation of the substantial empirical assumptions from which 
the inferences are made. The things that are found out are new only 
in the sense that the conclusions were not transparent to the unaided 
reasoning powers of the modeller.
A possible objection to identifying models with concrete 
external inferential apparatuses is that it amounts to confl ating 
models with individual model-descriptions. Most often scientists 
take the identity of a given model to be tied to an abstract, partially 
interpreted, mathematical object (e.g. a harmonic oscillator), which 
can be described in multiple different ways. However, although 
modelling necessarily involves abstracting, models in themselves 
are not abstract entities. Abstraction is an activity performed by a 
cognitive agent, but the end result of that activity, the abstraction 
of something, need not in itself be an abstract entity. Instead, it is 
(often) a material thing used to represent something. It is usually the 
inferential rather than the material properties of these abstractions 
that are epistemically important for the modeller. Although the 
material means of a representation often do matter in subtle ways 
for what inferences can be made with it (Vorms 2009), the aim 
in modelling is to minimize or control for these infl uences: if a 
conclusion derived from a model is found to be a consequence of a 
particular feature of a material representation lacking an intended 
interpretation, the conclusion is deemed to be an artefact without 
much epistemic value. Therefore, it often makes perfect sense 
to further abstract from multiple individual representations to 
their common inferential properties and then label these common 
inferential properties as ‘the’ model itself. These inferential properties 
are, of course, not intrinsic to the representations, but rather depend 
on the context in which they are used.  
There is, thus, no need to abandon the distinction between ‘the 
model’ and its various descriptions (cf. Mäki 2009). For example, 
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many kinds of public representations facilitate similar kinds of 
inferences from spring constants and amplitudes to total energy, 
and this makes all of these representations models of ‘the’ harmonic 
oscillator. Such abstractions are often extremely useful in co-
ordinating cognitive labour. By referring to them, we refer only to 
a set of inferences and can therefore disregard the material things 
that enable us to make these inferences in practice. The material 
form these representations may take is usually not relevant to the 
epistemic problems at hand: whether a differential equation was 
solved on a piece of paper, blackboard, or computer is not usually 
relevant to whether or not it was solved correctly. This is why it 
is natural to think that the ‘identity’ of the model of the harmonic 
oscillator resides precisely in these common inferential properties 
of the various material representations, i.e. in the abstract object. 
Nevertheless, we should resist reifying these abstractions as abstract 
objects in themselves.
The conception of modelling as extended inference also 
helps us to dismiss one common misconception about modelling, 
namely the idea that modelling automatically entails a preference 
for quantitative data or quantifi able issues over a more qualitative 
approach. The function of the mathematics is not to relate numbers, 
but to facilitate secure derivations from theoretical principles and 
thus to enable reasoning about matters that are too complex for 
natural language (Simon 1957, Ch. 6). Most social systems consist 
of multiple interdependencies and are frequently characterized 
by mutual consistency conditions involving multiple factors, such 
as equilibrium constraints. This makes them next to impossible to 
theorize about in natural language, which by its very nature can 
only reliably facilitate sequential inferences. Thus, despite the title 
of this dissertation, much of theoretical modelling in the social 
sciences is about the qualitative features of the socials systems 
modelled and need not involve any explicit statistics. The principal 
job of theoretical models is to keep our reasoning straight, not to 
mirror numerically exact laws of society.
What kind of model is appropriate depends on the goals of 
modelling: some types of models are obviously better suited to some 
specifi c purposes than others. Social scientifi c models can be used to 
suggest explanations for certain specifi c or general phenomena; to 
carry out virtual experiments; to specify and even help to execute 
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policies based on a model; to design new institutions; to make 
predictions; to conduct thought experiments using a model; to 
derive solutions to theoretical problems; to explore the limits and 
range of possible outcomes consistent with questions that can be 
answered using a model; to develop concepts and classifi catory 
systems; or simply as a pedagogical aid. Simple and analytically 
tractable models are usually taken to be good at conceptual 
elaboration, theory development and explanation. Among others, 
Boyd and Richerson (1987) argue that replacing unintelligible 
phenomena with unintelligible models does not increase our 
understanding and that simple models are thus appropriate for 
explanation. However, their uses can be limited. For example, 
Grüne-Yanoff (2009) takes a rather extreme position in suggesting 
that simple or ‘minimal’ models can only be used to disprove pre-
theoretic impossibility intuitions (such as that racial segregation 
cannot arise from non-racist preferences). Simple models (such as 
the IS-LM model in macroeconomics) are also usually well suited 
for pedagogical purposes, although complex simulations can also be 
used to provide illustrative examples. Relatively simple atheoretical 
associational models are often superior to more complex theoretical 
models in pure prediction tasks. On the other hand, policy analysis 
is often conducted with the aid of extremely complicated and data-
rich computer simulations that are used to predict the consequences 
of possible interventions (for example country- or city-specifi c 
epidemiological models and computational macroeconomic models 
used by central banks). The focus in the following essays is mostly 
on relatively simple theoretical models that aim to explain some 
puzzling societal phenomenon. Hence, the next issue to be explored 
is the contested nature of explanation.
 
4. Explanation: from covering laws to causation and constitution
One important function of theoretical models is to provide 
explanations. But should the social sciences be in the business 
of providing explanation in the fi rst place? One of the central 
methodological disputes within the social sciences has been about 
the alleged difference between interpretation and explanation and 
whether the social sciences should even strive to be explanatory. 
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The argument has been something like the following: since human 
action is not susceptible to universal laws, but its central constituents 
(beliefs and desires of the subjects) are immediately accessible to 
the social scientist through the process of emphatic identifi cation, 
interpretation, not explanation, is the road to greater understanding 
of society. One of the key ingredients in this debate has thus been 
the idea that explanation, as opposed to interpretation, is about 
subsuming singular events under universal laws. The question to 
ask now is whether the current views on the nature of explanation 
support this presupposition.
Measured by the number of publications, theory of explanation 
has been one of the most productive sub-fi elds of the philosophy of 
science for the last half a century. A part of the explanation for this 
striking fertility has to be the existence of a particularly good target 
at which all the discussants can aim their criticism: the deductive-
nomological model. The D-N model states that explanation amounts 
to a derivation of the explanandum-event from a set of initial 
conditions and at least one universal, exceptionless law (Hempel 
1965). The D-N model allowed the theory of explanation to fl ourish 
as subsequent counterexamples gave rise to new refi ned analyses 
which themselves prompted new counterexamples. Although the 
myriad of counterexamples has resulted in the almost universal 
abandonment of the D-N model (see, e.g., Woodward 2003, 154-
161), the form and methodology of this debate has left the theory of 
explanation largely stipulative in the sense that it has ignored the 
question of why we want explanations in the fi rst place; explanation 
just is the laying out of the causal history of an event (Salmon 1984) 
or unifi cation of our overall worldview (Kitcher 1989), or whatever 
seems to save the most pre-theoretical intuitions and historical 
explanatory improvements.  
The current contender to the throne, the contrastive 
counterfactual account of James Woodward (2003) used in the 
studies comprising this dissertation, is a marked improvement 
on this situation. According to Woodward, explanation consists 
of tracing or exhibiting functional dependency relations between 
variables. Explanation is thus doubly contrastive; the functional 
relationship links the possible values of the explanans to possible 
values of the explanandum. These explanatory relationships provide 
understanding by giving answers to what-if-things-had-been-
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different questions (w-questions) concerning the consequences of 
counterfactual or hypothetical changes in the values of the explanans 
variable. These answers are the basis of inferential performance 
constitutive of understanding. In the case of causal explanations 
or explanations given on the basis of a causal model, the relevant 
hypothetical changes to consider are interventions, ideally surgical 
manipulations that affect only the explanans variable of interest and 
leave the rest of the model intact (apart from the changes caused by 
the change in the explanans variable dictated by the model, of course). 
Causal explanations thus trace dependencies that are invariant under 
interventions. Woodward’s theory is essential for the fi rst part of 
the dissertation, but a broadly contrastive-counterfactual view of 
explanation is also presupposed in much of the argumentation in 
the second part.
Woodward’s account intimately links explanatory knowledge to 
our capacity to function in the world as goal-directed manipulators. 
Whereas the epistemic conception of explanation behind the D-N 
-model was exclusively concerned about expectability and predictive 
power, thus denying that explanatory information had any deeper 
import, Woodward’s theory stresses our role as active agents, as 
opposed to merely passive observers of events. The correlate concept 
of understanding refers to the ability to make correct inferences on 
the basis of received knowledge and causal knowledge concerns 
the effects of manipulations and therefore licenses inferences about 
the effects of our actions. Understanding thus lies not only in the 
correctness of inference, but sometimes also in the effectiveness of 
action based on the information to be understood. As is stated in 
the fi rst article, understanding should not be conceived as a special 
method or a mental state. Understanding is not a state-concept to 
begin with, but a concept akin to an ability attributed according to 
manifest performances (Ylikoski 2009). The criteria of understanding 
are public and the role of the concept is regulatory: attribution of 
understanding signals reliability of inference and action with respect 
to the object of understanding.
An important point concerning philosophical methodology is 
that the analytical import of the contrastive-counterfactual theory 
is not dependent on anybody’s intuitions about what is and what 
is not explanatory. The theory makes a crucial distinction between 
the kinds of inferences that can be legitimately made from purely 
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descriptive information and from causal/explanatory information: 
purely descriptive information does not license inferences beyond 
what has actually happened or what will likely happen if the system 
is left unperturbed. Whether one calls providing information with 
the appropriate modal implications explanation or exschlamation, 
and whether the attributions of explanatory power derived from 
the contrastive-counterfactual theory match all pre-theoretical 
intuitions, does not really matter. Hence, even in the unlikely event 
that some details of Woodward’s account were to be proven wrong 
in the future, much of the analytic work done with the contrastive-
counterfactual theory of explanation in this dissertation should still 
remain valid.
Woodward’s theory is a one of causal explanations. It is 
a realist theory in the sense that the exhibited invariant causal 
dependencies are a feature of the world and the existence of these 
dependencies is independent of our ways of conceptualization 
and representational practices. Explanation is also factive in that 
an explanation is genuine only when it is true, i.e., only when 
the required causal dependency obtains and the cited values of 
the variables are (suffi ciently) correct. These points are made 
here in order to alleviate the possible concern that stressing the 
inferential performance as constituent of understanding might 
render the approach somehow ‘instrumentalist’. Explanations refer 
to mind-independent things in the world and we can collectively 
be mistaken about whether an explanation is correct. Beyond this 
basic realist commitment, the contrastive-counterfactual theory is 
not really committed to any specifi c metaphysics of causation. The 
invariance-under-interventions account of causation is committed 
to the broadly accepted idea that causal dependencies are always (or 
at least outside fundamental physics) realized by a mechanism (and 
mechanistic ideas are certainly a key ingredient in this dissertation 
as well) but there are alternative metaphysical ways of cashing out 
this mechanistic idea (Glennan 2005; Machamer et.al. 2000). The 
choice of fundamental metaphysics for causation should not matter 
that much for analyses of explanations made on the basis of the 
interventionist account.
However, explaining something is still an epistemic activity, 
conducted by limited cognitive agents such as ourselves. Hence, 
explanations always relate things in the world conceptualized in 
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some way or another and our cognitive limitations set constraints 
on what and how we can reason about the relata of explanations. 
Thus, the goodness of an explanation depends also on how easily a 
limited cognitive agent can use the explanatory information to make 
relevant counterfactual inferences. Explicating the contrast class for 
an explanandum is a way of making the conceptualization of the 
explanandum explicit, and thus an object of argument and debate. 
The fact that explaining something is an epistemic activity also 
means that the explanatory information conveyed in an explanation 
has to be accessible to the receiver of the information – otherwise 
any improvement in inferential performance would be a complete 
mystery. Providing an actual explanation and claiming that there is 
one, somewhere to be found, are therefore not the same thing. As 
Woodward has argued, this simple enough point makes untenable 
theories of explanation that render the explanatoriness of a single 
explanation relative to either the whole belief system (unifi cation), 
or to a yet to be found ideal explanatory text (e.g. Railton 1981) 
(Woodward 2003, 179-181). Of course, this does not mean that a single 
scientist ought to be in the possession of all relevant information, 
all the time, in order to be judged to understand something. This 
would, in most cases, be beyond the cognitive powers of humans 
and require the idea that a single explanatory speech act or text 
passage could magically hold much more information than it 
actually does. The constraint of epistemic accessibility should be 
read as demanding that the explanatory information should be 
retrievable and usable by a relevant scientifi c sub-community, such 
as a research-group, in reasonable time. One should always keep in 
mind that scientifi c cognition is massively distributed and extended 
and that much less happens within individual heads than is usually 
thought in traditional philosophy of science.  
Causal dependency is not the only ontic dependency-relation 
supporting explanations. Many mechanistic explanations relate 
the causal properties of the parts of the mechanism (together with 
their organization) to a property of the whole. This relation of 
dependency is not causal, since it is not a process in time relating 
ontologically separate entities. Instead, it is a relation of constitution. 
The atomic structure of an elastic solid does not cause the object 
to be elastic since the atomic structure is not a distinct entity, or 
a set of distinct properties, from the elasticity of the object. Thus 
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far, constitutive explanation has received relatively little attention, 
Cummins 1983 and Craver 2007 being notable exceptions.  Luckily, 
the contrastive-counterfactual theory can also be generalized to 
cover constitutive explanation. Constitutive explanations answer 
w-questions concerning what would happen to a property of the 
whole if the properties or organization of the parts were changed 
(intervened on) in some way. The relevant conceptions of invariance 
and modularity have to be tweaked somewhat, since the constituted 
property cannot be intervened on independently of its constituting 
base (one cannot causally change the elasticity of an object without 
at the same time changing the properties of its atomic structure), but 
this is not a pressing concern here. Many model-based explanations 
in the social sciences are actually constitutive explanations, or at 
least will be argued as such in the following articles. 
5. Social sciences: The necessity of naturalism
The use of models is often associated with and legitimized by 
the nomothetic ideal of science that stresses the use of general or 
universal laws and predictive power as hallmarks of a truly scientifi c 
enterprise. Understandably, this frequent appeal to the nomothetic 
ideal may also be used as a reason to argue for the futility of 
modelling in areas where there seem to be no universal covering 
laws to be had, such as the social sciences. The nomothetic ideal of 
science is presupposed in much of the classical as well as current 
methodological discussion concerning idiographic/interpretive and 
nomothetic/functionalist paradigms of social research. It is clear 
that if explanation amounted to the subsumption of events under 
universal laws, then there would have been very few explanatory 
successes in the history of the social sciences and scant hope for any 
in the future as well.
Woodward’s theory of explanation is in many ways 
antithetical to the nomothetic ideal of science, and the conception 
of understanding as inferential ability accommodates both causal 
explanation as well as the products of interpretation and ascriptions 
of meaning. Universality and exceptionlessness are not the modal 
properties that make a relationship or generalization explanatory. 
Explanations trace dependencies, not occurrent regularities, and 
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generality is an epistemic and pragmatic virtue, but not itself 
constitutive of explanatory power. There might be a place for a 
substantial conception of a law of nature in philosophy of science, 
but that place is in the interpretation of fundamental physics, not the 
sciences of hierarchical complexity such as the biological sciences 
or, arguably, the social sciences. However, what the conception of 
understanding does require is that social scientifi c explanations pick 
out relations of either causal or constitutive dependence and these 
dependencies are features of the systems being investigated, not 
features of our conceptualizations or interpretations. Cataloguing 
the interpretations and meanings that the subjects attach to their 
social context is purely descriptive unless these meanings can be 
embedded in relations of causal or constitutive dependence.2 The 
same goes for intentional states attributed to individual agents: 
folk psychological rationalizations of behaviour are explanatory 
only if they pick out the true causes of behaviour, something that, 
it had been different, would have resulted in different behaviour 
as well. Thus, although the concept of explanation used here does 
not make use of the concept of natural law, it does support weak 
methodological naturalism in that, insofar as the social sciences 
should strive for explanations in the fi rst place, they are not 
characterized by any special method of verstehen incompatible with 
other forms of scientifi c explanation.
The contrastive-counterfactual theory of explanation and 
especially the importance of the concept of intervention also provide 
a strong argument for theoretical (in contrast to purely atheoretical 
empiricism) and explanatory (in contrast to purely interpretive) 
social science: only causal-explanatory knowledge allows us to 
change the society in a goal-directed manner. This brings us back to 
the emergence of the social sciences as distinct academic disciplines. 
The positive sciences of the society were founded upon the idea 
that empirical laws governing suicide, crime, poverty or mental 
illness could be discovered and that these laws could be used to 
maintain and improve the health of the newly created national 
states. Although the fruits of science-based societal engineering 
have proven to be much more modest than originally hoped for, 
2  See Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka and Kuorikoski (2008) for an extended 




the fundamental point still stands: without explanatory ambitions, 
social sciences lose their policy relevance and their broader societal 
relevance becomes suspect. 
The conception of understanding as inferential performance 
is defl ationary in that it denies that understanding has a deeper 
essence from which the public manifestations of understanding 
fl ow. This means that vague intuitions concerning intelligibility 
and appeals to the psychological sense of understanding can, in 
principle, always be calibrated or altogether replaced by making 
the implicit criteria of understanding explicit (Ylikoski 2009). Many 
methodological controversies and quarrels between disciplines and 
social scientifi c research traditions trade on unarticulated notions of 
what is a better explanation. Much of this bickering could be avoided 
and fruitful and constructive dialogue made possible if these vague 
intuitions about explanatory goodness and explanatory relevance 
were replaced by explicating what kinds of things are meant to be 
explained and how this explaining is to be done. The articulation 
of what can and cannot be explained with a given model, based 
on analyzing what kind of counterfactual inferences the model 
justifi es, can be seen as the central contribution made in the articles 
comprising this dissertation.
6. The need for theories of the middle range
As mentioned above, it can be argued that the sciences have 
become more and more model-centred. Mary Hesse (2000) argues 
that this trend started already in the 19th century. To some extent, 
this is also true of the social sciences. The fi rst steps of the social 
sciences as distinct scientifi c disciplines were inspired by, and to 
some extent founded on, the newly invented statistical apparatus 
of the 19th century. The 19th century also gave us the Edgeworth-
box, von Thünen’s isolated state (see, e.g., Mäki forthcoming) and 
the germs of the idea that economic knowledge should be moulded 
into a similar format as that of physical knowledge (Mirowski 1989). 
However, even economics did not really become thoroughly model-
based until around the middle of the 20th century, and the only 
truly widespread use of models in the other social sciences is still 
statistical modelling, purely descriptive as well as causal. Yet many 
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things are called models in the social sciences. Often an analytically 
useful conceptualization of phenomena represented with a 2-2 
fi eld or a hypothesis of simple causal connection represented by a 
boxes and arrows diagram is called a model. In these essays, the 
focus is limited to models in a stricter sense, to what might be 
called theoretical formal models. Theoretical modelling follows 
the strategy of indirect representation. By theoretical models, I 
mean external inferential devices that are used to infer non-trivial 
consequences from prior, usually theoretical, assumptions, not to 
infer estimates of theoretical constructs from masses of data. By non-
triviality, I mean that the inference essentially involves some kind of 
manipulation of the external inferential apparatus, usually syntactic 
manipulation of symbols according to well-defi ned syntactic rules. 
Thus, most theoretical models are indeed ‘formal’ or mathematical, 
but graphical reasoning and purely physical devices, such as the 
famous hydraulic economy of A.W. Phillips, qualify also. The focus 
on theoretical models also means that I am not addressing statistical 
models of either a descriptive or causal kind. Although statistical 
models always involve prior theoretical assumptions, they are still 
essentially data-driven in the sense that the conclusions of interest are 
about estimates of some parameter or other, not about what follows 
from a set of prior assumptions. Statistical modelling instantiates the 
strategy of abstract direct representation, not indirect representation 
(cf. Weisberg 2007). Especially statistical causal modelling involves 
completely different philosophical issues from those of theoretical 
modelling and would thus deserve a separate dissertation.
In philosophy of science, models have been conceived as 
mediating between theory and observation or between theory and 
the world. In the social sciences, modelling can be seen as a potential 
answer to another mediation problem, namely what Robert Merton 
famously described as the need for theories of the middle range. 
Merton accused ‘grand’ sociological theorizing as too abstract 
and general to of any use in understanding specifi c empirical 
phenomena. Grand theories á la Marx or Talcott Parsons serve only 
to conceptualize empirical social phenomena and do not actually 
exclude any relevant possibilities. Thus, grand theories do not offer 
any grounds for making inferences as to what might happen or might 
have happened and are for this reason non-explanatory. On the 
other hand, banal empiricism, either in the guise of blindly running 
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regressions (variable sociology) or cataloguing the qualitative 
interpretations or meanings that the subjects attach to their social 
context, is purely descriptive and thus also non-explanatory (Merton 
1957, section II). As has been claimed by the proponents of the 
recent analytical sociology movement (e.g., Hedström 2005), formal 
modelling can be seen as a promising methodology for producing 
such middle-range accounts. Although no single study in this 
dissertation includes an explicit argument for more widespread use 
of modelling in the social sciences, the dissertation as a whole can 
be seen as a supporting statement for modelling methodology in the 
social sciences.
Although economic modelling is the most prominent form 
of formal modelling in the social sciences, it is by no means the 
whole story. The boundaries between the different social sciences 
have traditionally been drawn according to the scale and nature 
of the forces they study. Sociology studies the non-market driven 
societal or macro phenomena in industrial and post-industrial 
societies, economics (arguably) phenomena governed by markets, 
social psychology interaction in relatively small groups etc. These 
traditional ways of defi ning the division of labour in the social 
sciences do correspond to some extent to differences in their 
respective modelling practices. Economists’ theoretical practices 
nowadays consist nearly entirely of modelling with only a relatively 
limited set of modelling methodologies, whereas few sociologists 
rely on modelling, but those who do use a more heterogenous set of 
model templates (Edling 2002).
However, modelling frameworks cross disciplinary boundaries 
and an argument could be made that the traditional way of dividing 
the disciplines should be, and is actually in the process of being, 
replaced by a division of labour according to the use of different 
modelling tools (Humphreys 2004, 71). Most models in social sciences 
are indeed more or less of the off-the-shelf type, i.e. abstract structures 
that can be applied with varying degrees of adjustment to systems 
with intuitively very different causal make-ups. The principles of 
stochastic processes, network models or constraint optimization are 
similar regardless of who or what (individuals, groups, countries, 
ideas…) is doing the random walking, networking or maximizing. 
However, as will become apparent later, this does not mean that 
there are no important discipline related differences in the ways in 
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which these templates are applied. For example, sociologists and 
economists conceptualize, use and interpret simulation models in 
importantly different ways and these differences refl ect the deep 
methodological and substantial differences in their respective 
approaches to social phenomena.
7. On philosophical method and the division of cognitive labour
Scientifi c research reports always include a section devoted to 
methodology. Interestingly enough, this is not true of every, or even 
most, treatises in philosophy. If there is a distinct methodology used 
in the studies comprising this dissertation, it is not philosophical 
conceptual analysis – at least if conceptual analysis is understood 
as the formulation of explicit accounts of some pre-theoretically 
understood concept which are then tested against pre-theoretic or 
‘expert’ intuitions of philosophers (Kitcher 1992). Although these 
studies do not use philosophical conceptual analysis, the points 
being made are largely conceptual in nature. Although, as Quine 
has taught us (1951), no such unique and universal line can be 
drawn between conceptual and empirical content that would neatly 
classify every possible statement across all time as being of one kind 
or the other, conceptual and empirical content can and should be 
distinguished locally (as a good example, see Burian et. al. 1996). 
One only has to acknowledge that all defi nitions are in principle 
always open to revision and that the fi nal criterion of ‘truth’ of 
any conceptual claim is whether its acknowledgement removes 
confusion and decreases errors in reasoning within the inferential 
practices in which the concept is actually used. Thus any conceptual 
claims should not be primarily tested against the intuitions of the 
philosopher, but against arguments that are in the end empirically 
motivated and, ultimately, against whether or not the conceptual 
claims are of any help in the practice of science itself. 
This does not mean that scientists could never err in conceptual 
matters or in their self-assessment of what they are doing. Contrary 
to the widespread misconception, even thorough naturalism 
does not preclude a normative, evaluative stance on the scientifi c 
practices studied. In my view, philosophical accounts should fi rst 
and foremost guard against faulty reasoning and a philosophical 
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account can judge a specifi c modelling practice, explanation or an 
expression of momentary self-refl ection made by a scientist to be in 
error as long as the grounds for the judgement include something 
more than the mere intuitions of the philosopher. For example, 
the drawing of a conceptual distinction may help in identifying 
fallacious inferences that arise from using the same word in two 
different inferential contexts. And whether these inferences are 
fallacious or not is grounded, in the end, not on platonic meanings 
or essences, but on the inevitable errors that arise from mismatches 
between our linguistic and non-linguistic practices and the causal 
structure of the world. The fact that philosophy and the sciences 
are on the same continuum does not mean that the former has no 
say on the validity of particular claims made in the latter sphere – 
quite the contrary. Philosophy can take part in the scientifi c debate 
precisely because it is, or to the extent that it is, part of science. What 
should count in science as well as in philosophy are the arguments, 
and arguments are evaluated on the basis of the credibility and 
relevance of the reasons and the validity of the argument form,3 not 
on the basis of the department the maker of the argument happens 
to be affi liated with.
Most of the data used in these studies is not from the 
unfortunately under-researched area of explanatory cognition 
(although especially the fi rst essay is informed by it), nor from 
systematic surveys of what scientists themselves take their models 
to explain, nor from ethnographic fi eld studies investigating 
how scientists actually build their models. Although thoroughly 
naturalistic, these essays are not about the psychology or self-
understanding of social scientists. If these studies were primarily 
about scientifi c cognition, then empirically exploring ‘cognition 
in the wild’ would be the way to proceed (cf. Hutchins 1995). In 
contrast, the theses argued in these studies are about the content of 
science, and the primary data are therefore scientifi c research articles 
and the explicit arguments used by the scientists themselves. The 
content of science is the public corpus of knowledge and methods 
distributed within the scientifi c community and on the pages of 
3  The trouble with much of philosophy is that the reasons, which are 
usually either semantic (‘we would not call something x, if it did 
not…’) or modal (‘it would be impossible for x to be y if it did not…’), 
are often neither credible nor relevant.
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scientifi c journals, not the mental states or psychological processes 
within the heads of individual scientists.
Another feature these studies share with their more scientifi c 
cousins is that most of them are collaborations. This is not a defect 
but a virtue. Since the content of philosophy does not qualitatively 
differ from that of the special sciences, neither should its method 
of production. The romantic lay-conception of philosophers (and 
probably a self-conception of a good many philosophers as well) 
has been of a lone heroic mind, solitarily exploring the fundamental 
nature of reality or human existence. But science is a fundamentally 
social enterprise and scientifi c cognition is massively extended and 
distributed. What is truly constitutive of scientifi c progress is not 
what happens inside any individual head, but the collaborative 
effort in laboratories and on the pages of scientifi c journals. The same 
should be true of philosophy as well. The philosopher does not have 
any privileged access to The Truth and there is no psychological 
evidence suggesting that the belief system of an individual (even 
of a philosopher) is usually more coherent than that of a collective 
(such as a research group of a fi eld). Just as any other well-developed 
fi eld of knowledge production, philosophy should embrace the 
gains of division of labour, which, after all, is the very foundation 
of modernity.
8. Overview of the articles
The remainder of this dissertation is divided into two parts. The 
fi rst part develops the general conceptual tools with which to 
understand and evaluate model-based explanations in the social 
sciences. Although the primary intended application is the social 
sciences, the fi rst three articles are essentially general philosophy of 
science. The fi rst article lays down the theory of explanation used 
throughout and develops the different dimensions of explanatory 
power. The next two articles explore two concepts central to social 
science modelling: equilibrium and mechanism. The fi nal part of this 
dissertation applies these concepts and ideas to specifi c modelling 
techniques in the social sciences. The fourth article discusses the 
impact of unrealistic assumptions on the validity of explanations 
based on rational choice models, and the fi fth article explores the use 
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of robustness analysis in gauging and ameliorating this impact in 
economics. The sixth article argues that the resistance to theoretical 
agent-based simulations in economics is partly due to the specifi c, 
though implicit, conception of understanding held by economists. 
I Dissecting Explanatory Power
The claim that some model or theory provides a better explanation 
than another is often used as an argument in favour of that model or 
theory and disputes between approaches and whole disciplines are 
often couched in terms of explanatory power. But these disputes and 
arguments invariably fail to articulate the used criterion or criteria of 
the goodness of explanation. What does it actually mean to explain 
something better or worse? Is there a standard or metric according 
to which we can compare explanations and is this metric different 
and independent from the comparative credibility or probability of 
the rival explanations? The fi rst article aims to provide answers to 
these questions and thus lays down the conceptual tools used to 
discuss various models and explanations in the rest of the articles. 
‘Dissecting Explanatory Power’ uses the contrastive-
counterfactual theory to articulate fi ve dimensions of explanatory 
power: precision, non-sensitivity, factual accuracy, degree of integration 
and cognitive salience. The guiding principle behind this taxonomy 
is simple: The more correct inferences to counterfactual situations 
can actually be made on the basis of the explanatory information 
(by a cognitively limited human agent), the better the explanation. 
That the relevant inferences are to concern counterfactual situations 
means that explanatory information characteristically has 
implications beyond what actually happened or what will happen 
if nothing is changed. The requirement that the inferences have to 
be actually achievable by cognitively limited beings, such as us, is a 
consequence of treating explaining as a concrete epistemic activity 
involving real people, not as an end product of completed science 
of philosophers’ fantasies. These dimensions can be in confl ict 
with each other and there are some systematic trade-offs between 
them. Thus, different disciplines can give different weights to these 
aspects of explanatory goodness and thereby systematically value 
certain kinds of explanations. These explanatory virtues should also 
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be kept distinct from evidential virtues; whether an explanation is 
good is a different question from whether a putative explanation is 
likely to be true, and all the explanatory virtues are characterized 
with the presupposition that the explanation is (roughly) true.
II Explaining with Equilibria
Most theoretical models in the social sciences are tightly linked to 
two concepts: equilibrium and mechanism. The concept of equilibrium 
is almost defi nitional for economic model building, but the majority 
of other social scientifi c models also incorporate some equilibrium 
concept or other. This is not a coincidence, a purely empirical claim 
or (only) a matter of prevalent conservative socio-political views 
modellers have about the nature of society. Equilibrium methodology 
is an almost necessary consequence of (at least) two constraints on 
formal modelling: the requirement of analytic tractability and the 
relative paucity of solid and yet generalizable empirical constraints 
on modelling assumptions.
Many modellers in the social sciences, especially economists and 
so-called economics imperialists, argue that equilibrium modelling 
holds some intrinsic scientifi c virtues (see, e.g., Lazear 2000). Are 
equilibrium explanations then somehow especially virtuous? This is 
precisely the kind of question a philosophical theory of explanation 
should be good for. Yet despite their importance, equilibrium 
explanations have thus far received little philosophical attention. A 
notable exception is Elliott Sober’s article ‘Equilibrium Explanation’ 
(1983), in which Sober argues that equilibrium explanations 
constitute a counterexample to the causal theory of explanation, 
since the initial condition of an equilibrium system, the causal 
history of the equilibrium state, are explanatorily irrelevant for the 
equilibrium state. The argument in ‘Explaining with Equilibria’ is 
that Sober has misidentifi ed the principal explanans of equilibrium 
models. Since explanation requires dependency, not regularity 
or stability, it is the structural properties (encoded in parameter 
values and functional forms), that explain specifi c properties of 
equilibria, rather than the initial conditions explaining the obtaining 
of equilibrium, as Sober thinks. This explanatory relationship is 
constitutive, not causal, since it relates properties of the parts of the 
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system to a systemic property of the whole and is not in itself a 
process in time (although equilibriation itself is a process in time, of 
course). This constitutive dependency can in turn be used to causally 
explain changes in the equilibrium state by structural changes in the 
underlying equilibrium mechanism. In terms of modelling, this is 
the standard practice of comparative statics familiar from textbook 
economics. The points above suggest that any perceived epistemic 
advantages of equilibrium explanations arise from the fact that 
modelling the underlying equilibriating mechanism is often possible 
with only relatively modest assumptions about the constituent 
parts of the mechanism, not from the fact that we can be ignorant 
about the actual initial conditions of the system. This means that the 
equilibrium dynamics usually do play an explanatory role, since the 
explanatory structural assumptions about the causal properties of 
the mechanism components are often embedded in the arguments 
for the adopted dynamics. 
III  Two Concepts of Mechanism: Componential Causal System and 
Abstract Form of Interaction
Theoretical models and middle range theories in the social sciences 
are usually conceived as being about social mechanisms. Social 
mechanisms are thought to be relatively stable constellations of 
social actions that generate statistically discernible regularities. 
Social mechanisms are also precisely what Merton’s middle range 
theories should capture. As argued in ‘Explaining with Equilibria’, 
equilibrium models, insofar as they are about causal relations to 
begin with, are essentially models of mechanisms and the primary 
explanatory relationship is that of constitution between the properties 
of the parts and a property of the whole. When pressed about the 
concept of social mechanism, analytically minded social theorists 
usually refer to something akin to methodological individualism 
(see the essays in Hedström and Swedberg 1998). The concept of 
mechanism seems to refer to little more than to the idea of explaining 
something macro with something more micro, to the idea that this 
explanation has something to do with the causal properties of the 
micro and to some account of sequentiality or process.
The concept of mechanism is also enjoying something of a boom 
in the philosophy of science literature. The ‘new mechanists’ have 
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offered mechanistic accounts of explanation, research strategies, 
inter-fi eld relations and metaphysics of causation (Bechtel 2006; 
Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Craver 2007; Glennan 1996; Machamer 
et. al. 2000). The concept of mechanism seems to fi t the sciences of 
multi-layered hierarchical complexity (such as cellular biology) 
better than the concept of law borrowed from the philosopher’s 
conception of fundamental physics. However, the mechanisms 
discussed in this philosophical literature bear little resemblance 
to the social mechanisms described by analytic sociologists, for 
example. The question thus remains whether this philosophical 
literature has any bearing for methodological issues concerning 
mechanistic reasoning in the social sciences. In ‘Two Concepts of 
Mechanism’, I distinguish between two conceptions of what it is to 
be a mechanism, which are based on two very different ways of 
mechanistic theorizing and empirical research. The new mechanists 
take mechanisms to be componential causal systems, in which the 
intrinsic causal properties of ontologically distinguishable parts 
realize the functional or system-level properties of the mechanism 
according to their organization. The idea is that a quintessential 
mechanism is a contrivance serving a function, itself composed of 
a number of parts serving different causal roles. Exploring such 
mechanisms proceeds along the heuristics of decomposition and 
localization discussed in the literature on mechanistic research in 
the life sciences (Bechtel and Richardson 1993).
In the social sciences, the concept of mechanism should 
not be taken so literally. Social mechanisms are better seen as 
structurally similar forms of agent interaction, what I call abstract 
forms of interaction. In contrast to componential causal systems, our 
understanding of such mechanisms is not necessarily improved 
by leaning more about the intrinsic causal properties of the most 
obvious parts of the social systems (individuals), since the causal 
properties relevant for the system level property are relational, 
rather than monadic. Thus, the way to gain understanding is to 
reason about the consequences of different forms of interaction by 
building simple and idealized models, and only combining these 
models to reason about the properties of constellations of multiple 
mechanisms (cf. Boyd and Richerson 1987). However, both concepts 
of mechanism have similar explanatory virtues familiar from the 
literature on mechanistic explanation. It should also be stressed 
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that the distinction does not match neatly any imagined boundary 
between the natural and human sciences. 
Since both concepts of mechanism are associated with distinct 
research heuristics, their use carries the possibility of introducing 
characteristic biases to the research and explanations utilizing 
them. The typical biases associated with the componential causal 
system -conception include many reductionistic fallacies discussed 
by William Wimsatt (2007), such as misguidedly attributing a 
relational property to be an intrinsic property of a component part or 
presupposing too much context-insensitivity to the causal properties 
of the component parts. Abstract form of interaction -concepts 
(AFI) may induce other kinds of biases, such as automatically 
attributing further causal properties to the component parts of an 
AFI-mechanism on the basis that the component parts of some other 
similar AFI-mechanism also exhibit them. An exclusive focus on 
only certain kinds of AFI-concepts, perhaps motivated by some ideal 
of cross-disciplinary unifi cation, can also lead to myopic research, 
which misses important causal properties of the systems under 
investigation. This danger is clear in the imperialistic applications 
of economic ideas that use market metaphors to explain all kinds of 
societal phenomena.
IV Unrealistic Assumptions in Rational Choice Theory
Theoretical models in the social sciences are almost invariably 
highly unrealistic. The multi-dimensional complexity of societal 
phenomena makes idealizations and other falsehoods necessary if 
the models are to be tractable or possess any degree of generality. The 
realism of assumptions has been a much discussed methodological 
issue as long as there has been modelling. Most of this discussion in 
the social sciences has concentrated on the set of idealizations that 
are almost defi nitional of economic models, i.e., the assumptions 
depicting the rational economic man. 
In ‘Unrealistic Assumptions in Rational Choice Theory’, Aki 
Lehtinen and I argue that much of the methodological discussion 
concerning rational choice theory is misguided in that it presupposes 
that there is a unitary and substantial rational choice theory 
underlying all its models. We argue instead that rational choice 
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models can explain in different ways and that the empirical and 
explanatory content is usually not found in the rationality axioms, 
but in the operationalization arguments used to transfer the abstract 
machinery of constrained optimization and equilibrium into 
empirically interpretable models. When looking at the realisticness 
of the assumptions, one should thus fi rst look at the way in which 
the self-interest assumption is actually interpreted in the model as 
behavioural or motivational assumptions. The reason why rational 
choice seems to work better in intuitively economic matters is that 
these operationalization arguments are usually much more credible 
in straightforwardly economic contexts than in non-economic 
‘imperialistic’ applications. 
Second, whether making unrealistic assumptions invalidates 
the explanations made on the basis of the corresponding model 
depends on whether the model-result is dependent on something 
that is obviously wrong in these assumptions. Explanation is about 
tracing dependencies and if the explanatory dependency (the 
model-result) itself is not dependent on some particular falsehood 
in the assumptions, that particular falsehood does not matter for 
the model’s explanatory value. Thus when Woodward’s theory 
of explanation is applied to rational choice models, three distinct 
kinds of explanantia can be discerned. First, some rational choice 
models can indeed be seen as formalized and usually aggregated 
intentional (folk-psychological) explanations in that the self-interest 
assumption is interpreted as telling what the motivations of the 
agents are supposed to be and that the model result (explanation) 
is dependent on the correctness of this assumption. Second, some 
rational choice models should be interpreted as (legitimately) 
claiming only that the agents act as if they were maximizing their 
self-interested utility. If some other factors (like selection) make it 
plausible that the aggregate behavioural consequences are consistent 
with this assumption, the accuracy of the psychological attribution 
does not matter. Third, sometimes even the individual behavioural 
assumptions are not what drive the result. Some well-known 
rational choice modelling results demonstrate such highly abstract 
and generic systemic properties, that they are largely robust with 
respect to what the agents are supposed to know, want or behave. 
These may not be the most interesting of properties of social systems, 
but accusing such models on the basis that they make unrealistic 
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assumptions concerning the agents is not the right way of criticizing 
the modelling practice in question.
V Economic Modelling as Robustness Analysis
As Uskali Mäki has suggested, some idealizations are introduced 
into models in order to isolate a specifi c causal tendency from 
the clutter of real world phenomena (Mäki 1992; 1994). However, 
many falsities in models are there because of the requirements of 
mathematical tractability – the specifi c assumption could not be 
included in the mathematical model in a more realistic manner 
in a way that would have left the model to still be analytically 
solvable (Hindriks 2006). Models are representations built using 
formal languages and this means that assumptions have to often 
be implemented in the model in a more specifi c form than would 
really be justifi able on empirical grounds. For example, there might 
be reason to believe that an interesting economic phenomenon is 
dependent on transportation costs, but no reason to think that the 
particular form of transportation costs should matter, and perhaps 
no data showing what the transportation costs look like in potential 
areas of application. However, the costs have to be implemented 
somehow and the model might be conveniently solvable using 
a particular functional form for the transportation costs – a form 
which happens to be known to be false.
‘Economic Modelling as Robustness Analysis’ argues that the 
peculiar practice of model refi nement in economics, in which the same 
well-known results are repeatedly derived using slightly different 
alternative modelling assumptions, can be, somewhat charitably, 
interpreted as a process of collective derivational robustness analysis 
– a strategy of testing which false assumptions are actually fatal for 
the common modelling results or theorems. The article uses William 
Wimsatt’s account of robustness analysis (2007, chpt. 4) to provide an 
epistemic rationale for this practice by showing how the procedure 
guards against the inevitable falsities in modelling assumptions. 
Robustness is here understood in an epistemic sense, as a property 
of our representational and inferential apparatuses rather than as 
a causal property of the investigated systems. Robustness analysis 
gauges the extent to which we can get away with not knowing all 
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the details and still understand the mechanism. This means that 
sticking to roughly the same modelling framework may not be an 
irrational (or ideological) bias, distorted view of human nature or 
even a metaphysical prejudice, but a reasonable response to the 
paucity of data and the complexity and heterogeneity of the studied 
phenomenon. The article also provides an argument showing how 
derivational robustness analysis can rationally change our beliefs 
about the world without bringing in new observations; if our degree 
of belief in different modelling assumptions varies, then learning 
that a specifi c modelling result does not depend on particular false 
assumptions, rationally raises our confi dence about the modelling 
result.
VI Computing the Perfect Model: Why Do Economists Shun Simulation?
Tractability assumptions are usually necessitated by the requirement 
that the model can be solved analytically, i.e., that the equilibrium 
conditions, the equilibrium state or some relevant partial derivatives 
can actually be analytically derived from the model, rather than 
inferred by computing the model output using a range of different 
model inputs or parameter values. Analytic solutions have been 
highly regarded especially in economics, which has historically 
been averse to computational methods in general and to agent-
based micro simulations in particular. This is somewhat peculiar, 
especially compared to the other social sciences, in which agent-
based simulations have been relatively prominent (with respect to 
the use of any theoretical models) ever since computational methods 
have been widely available. Computational methods are becoming 
ever more prevalent in economics, but they are still mostly used to 
compute equilibrium paths of models structured in the same way 
as the old analytic equilibrium models (e.g. computational dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models), rather than true agent based 
simulations. Do analytic solutions have some epistemic properties 
that make them attractive to the extent that the consequent costs 
in model realism are justifi ed? ‘Computing the Perfect Model: Why 
Do Economists Shun Simulation’ provides a tentative answer: not 
really. The article catalogues the epistemic virtues attributed to 
analytic solutions, such as generality, epistemic transparency and 
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comparability with respect to other models, and differentiates 
between the possible senses in which the computer can be said to 
be an epistemically opaque black box. However, an advocate of true 
bottom-up simulation techniques can, in principle, answer all these 
criticisms. 
As a tentative hypothesis for the lack of enthusiasm of the 
economists, the article suggests that simulations do not fi t well 
with the particular conception of scientifi c understanding shared 
by economists: the ideal of the perfect economic model. The very 
training and the admission criteria to the top theoretical journals 
tell of an implicit conception of understanding in which the very 
(cognitive) act of deriving the model solution is a constitutive part 
of understanding of the model and, consequently, of economic 
phenomena. This implicit conception is compared to Philip 
Kitcher’s theory of scientifi c explanation (1989; 1993), according 
to which deriving descriptions of phenomena to be explained 
with the help of a set of fi xed argument patterns also constitutes 
the cognitive element in the concept of scientifi c understanding. 
Kitcher’s idea that reasoning and explaining is about the application 
of argument schemas fi ts well with economists’ practice of using 
the same principles of utility maximization and equilibrium to 
explain diverse phenomena. However, from the viewpoint of the 
contrastive-counterfactual theory and the associated conception of 
understanding as inferential ability, this derivational conception 
and the associated ideal of unifi cation are on the wrong tracks. Thus, 
economists’ resistance to agent-based simulation is at least partly 
misguided (although there are a number of legitimate causes for 
distrusting simulations independent of the misguided conception 
of understanding).
9. Concluding remarks
What can we take home from theses studies? In practice, evaluations 
and comparisons of explanations are almost always based on vague 
and implicit criteria – on unarticulated and idiosyncratic intuitions. 
These intuitions are the product of accidents of personal intellectual 
histories and disciplinary indoctrination, not of an explicit and reason-
based discussion about the epistemic goals of a particular scientifi c 
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enterprise. Yet judgements of explanatory relevance and goodness 
of explanation are constantly being used in debates concerning 
the relative merits of rival theories or whole research approaches 
and paradigms. This situation is especially prominent in the social 
sciences. On the one hand, explanations based on equilibrium 
concepts, explanations referring to underlying mechanisms in 
general or individual action in particular or explanations based on 
analytically solvable models are simply taken to be better or more 
‘scientifi c’ than some alternatives. On the other hand, explanations 
based on familiar folk-psychological concepts and couched in a 
narrative form are almost guaranteed to elicit the psychological 
sense of understanding and thus give an impression of providing 
especially deep insights into social phenomena. A situation in which 
major epistemological principles driving method and theory choice 
remain implicit and beyond reasoned debate is clearly not optimal 
with respect to the advancement of the social sciences. The aim of 
these studies is to improve this situation.
These theses are based on an exceedingly simple idea: 
intuitions about explanatory relevance and explanatory power 
should be replaced by explicating what is supposed to depend on 
what. Explanation traces dependencies, not regularities, and the 
understanding provided by an explanation can be made explicit 
by enumerating the inferences to counterfactual situations made 
possible by the knowledge of the explanatory dependency. After 
these matters have been settled, evaluation of the evidence for the 
explanatory dependency and the theoretic and pragmatic relevance 
of the explanatory information can commence – and this time starting 
from assumptions that have been explicitly discussed and hopefully 
agreed upon. This central idea is presented and elaborated in the fi rst 
article ‘Dissecting Explanatory Power’, in which fi ve dimensions of 
explanatory virtue are differentiated.
Explanations trace dependencies and understanding is 
competence in counterfactual inference. From these ideas it follows 
that equilibrium models can explain causally as well as constitutively. 
However, their explanatory power does not fl ow from the fact that 
we can ignore the exact initial conditions nor are they somehow 
especially scientifi c. Equilibrium models are useful to the extent 
that we can constitutively explain interesting systemic properties 
with only modest assumptions about the causal properties of the 
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constituent parts. The central ideas also help us to see beyond the 
intuitive idea that uncovering mechanisms is explanatory. They help 
us to see how and why descriptions of mechanisms are explanatory 
and that there is more than one concept of mechanism at play in the 
sciences, concepts that correspond to different ways of modelling 
and doing empirical research. 
The correct identifi cation of the explanandum and the explanans – 
of what depends on what – is of crucial importance in the assessment 
of social science models. It is not enough to just accuse a model of 
making unrealistic assumptions, since all models invariably do so. 
Such criticism is valid only if the explanatory dependency is itself 
dependent on the false assumptions. As an example, rational choice 
models are not all alike in this respect and the explanatory factors can 
differ from model to model. This is something that is missed by most 
of the critics of rational choice. However, this point by itself is not an 
argument for rational choice modelling. The use of rational choice 
templates is in all probability a severely biased research heuristic 
and other model types should be used to control for its characteristic 
errors – but pursuing this line of argument goes beyond the scope 
of this dissertation (but see Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2008). More 
generally, the checking of robustness of the modelling result with 
respect to problematic modelling assumptions is an important part 
of theoretical modelling. This observation can be used to partially 
account for the peculiar practice of deriving old and well-known 
results from slightly different assumptions, which is found in the 
pages of economics journals. There is a clear epistemic rationale 
to this practise: modelling is inference and robustness analysis is a 
means of gauging and sometimes improving the reliability of our 
model-based inferential practices.
Unarticulated intuitions concerning the very essence of 
understanding remain a powerful factor driving the choice of 
methodology. This is apparent in economists’ attitudes towards 
agent-based simulations, which do not fi t the economists’ conception 
of perfect economic model. For economists, the very act of deriving 
a conclusion from a small set of privileged economic concepts is the 
gold standard of economic understanding. But explanations trace 
dependencies and understanding is competence in counterfactual 
inference. The criterion of correct understanding should be whether 
the counterfactual inferences are correct and reliable, not how the 
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inferences are made (e.g., according to a particular equilibrium 
argument pattern) or to what extent the reasoning process is 
offl oaded outside individual heads. 
But what if explanation is not essentially about dependencies 
and what if understanding is something other than inferential 
competence? Even though I have criticized the evidential use of 
philosophical intuition, is it not the case that my preferred theory 
of explanation in the end rests on intuitions about what really is 
explanatory? This is not the case. The reader is free to insist that 
something else, such as deriving a description of a phenomenon 
from initial conditions and natural laws, is what explanation is 
really about, but the conclusions concerning the kinds of inferences 
the exhibition of invariant dependencies enables still stand. If the 
preferred alternative essence of explanation or understanding 
holds some further epistemic value over and above the inferential 
conception advocated here, the burden of proof is upon the reader 
to demonstrate this. If the observations made in these studies help, 
even just a little bit, to make our criteria for good model building and 
model-based explanations more transparent, then this dissertation as 
a whole is an argument in favour of the philosophical theories used 
therein. My ultimate hope is thus that these studies will show that 
philosophy of science can be relevant for the practise of science.
Bibliography
Bailer-Jones, Daniela (2003), “When Scientifi c Models Represent”, 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1): 59-74.
Bartels, Anders (2006), “Defending the Structural Concept of Representation”, 
Theoría, 21(1): 7-19.
Bechtel, William (2006), Discovering Cell Mechanisms: The Creation of Modern 
Cell Biology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Bechtel, William and Robert Richardson (1993), Discovering Complexity: 
Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientifi c Research, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
Black, Max (1962), Models and Metaphors. Studies in Language and Philosophy. 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Brandom, Robert (1994), Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representation 
and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge MA and London: Harvard 
University Press.
Boltzmann, Ludwig (1911), “Models”, In Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed.). 
(pp. 638-640).Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Society by Numbers
46
Boyd, R. and P. Richerson (1987): “Simple models of complex phenomena.” 
In: J. Dupre (ed.) The Latest on the Best, Cambridge MA: The MIT Press: 
27-52.
Burian, Richard M., Robert C. Richardson, and Wim J. van der Steen (1996), 
“Against generality: Meaning in genetics and philosophy,” Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of Science 27: 1-29.
Contessa, Gabriele (2007), “Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative 
Reasoning”, Philosophy of Science 71: 48-68. 
Craver, Carl (2007), Explaining the Brain, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Cummins, Robert (1983), The Nature of Psychological Explanation, Cambridge 
MA: The MIT Press
de Donato Rodríguez, Xavier and Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2009), “Credibility, 
Idealisation, and Model Building: An Inferential Approach”, Erkenntnis 
70: 101-118
Edling, Cristofer R. (2002), “Mathematics in Sociology”, Annual Review of 
Sociology 28:197-220.
French, Steven. (2003), “A model-theoretic account of representation (or, 
I don’t know much about art…but I know it involves isomorphism)”, 
Philosophy of Science 70: 1472–1483.
French, Steven and Ladyman, James (1999), “Reinfl ating the Semantic 
Approach”, International Studies in Philosophy of Science, 13. pp. 99-117
Giere, Ronald (1988), Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Giere, Ronald (2002), “Models as Parts of Distributive Cognitive Systems”, 
in Magnani, Lorenzo and  Nersessian, Nancy (eds.): Model Based 
Reasoning: Science, Technology, Values, Kluwer: 227-241.
Giere, Ronald (2004), “How Models Are Used to Represent Reality”, 
Philosophy of Science 71: S742-752.
Giere, Ronald (forthcoming), “An Agent-Based Conception of Models and 
Scientifi c Representation”, Synthese.
Glennan, Stuart (1996), “Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation”, 
Erkenntnis 44: 49-71.
Glennan, Stuart (2005), “Modelling Mechanisms”, Studies in the History and 
Philolosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36: 443-464. 
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2006), “The Strategy of Model-Based Science”, Biology 
and Philosophy, 21, 725-740.
Green, Donald and Ian Shapiro (1994), Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: 
A Critique of Applications in Political Science, New Haven: Yale University 
Press.
Grüne-Yanoff, Till (2009), “Learning from Minimal Economic Models”, 
Erkenntnis 70: 81-99.
Hanson, Norwood (1958), Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hedström, Peter (2005), Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytic 
Sociology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hedström, Peter and Richard Swedberg (eds.) (1998), Social Mechanisms: 




Hesse, Mary (2000), “Models and Analogies”, in W.H. Newton-Smith (ed.) A 
Companion to the Philosophy of Science, pp. 299-307. Bodmin: Blackwell.
Hindriks, Frank (2006), “Tractability Assumptions and the Musgrave-Mäki-
Typology”, Journal of Economic Methodology 13: 401-423.
Humphreys, Paul (2004), Extending Ourselves: Computational Science, 
Empiricism, and Scientifi c Method. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hutchins, Edwin (1995), Cognition in the Wild, Cambridge MA: The MIT 
Press.
Kakkuri-Knuuttila, M-L., K. Lukka and J. Kuorikoski (2008), “Straddling 
between paradigms: A naturalistic philosophical case study on 
interpretive research in management accounting”, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 33: 267-291.
Kitcher, Philip (1989), “Explanatory Unifi cation and the Causal Structure 
of the World”, in Kitcher and Salmon (eds.): Scientifi c Explanation, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 410-505.
Kitcher, Philip (1992), “The Naturalists Return”, The Philosophical Review 
101: 53-114.
Kitcher, Philip (1993), The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, 
Objectivity Without Illusions, Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Knuuttila, Tarja and Jaakko Kuorikoski (forthcoming), “ Idealized 
Representations, Inferential Devices and Cross-Disciplinary Tools: 
Theoretical Models in Social Sciences”, in Jarvie, Ian and Jesús Zamora 
Bonilla (eds.), Sage Handbook of Philosophy of  Social Science¸ Sage. 
Kuorikoski, Jaakko and Aki Lehtinen (2009), ”Incredible Worlds, Credible 
Results”, Erkenntnis 70: 119-131.
Lazear, Edward (2000), “Economic Imperialism”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115: 99-146.
Merton, Robert K. (1957), On Theoretical Sociology. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Mirowski, Philip (1989), More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, 
Physics as Nature’s Economics, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press.
Morgan, Mary and Margaret Morrison (1999), Models as Mediators. Perspectives 
on Natural and Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morrison, Margaret and Mary S. Morgan (1999), ”Models as Mediating 
Instruments”, in Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison (eds.), Models 
as Mediators. Perspectives on Natural and Social Science. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 10-37. 
Mäki, Uskali (1992), “On the method of isolation in economics”, Poznań 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science and Humanities 26: 316–351. Amsterdam: 
Rodopi
Mäki, Uskali (1994), “Isolation, Idealization and Truth in Economics”, 
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 38: 147-
168. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Mäki, Uskali (2005), “Models are Experiments, Experiments are Models”, 
Journal of Economic Methodology 12: 303-315.
Mäki, Uskali (2009), “MISSing the World. Models as Isolations and Credible 
Society by Numbers
48
Surrogate Systems”, Erkenntnis 70: 29-43.
Mäki, Uskali (forthcoming), “Models and the Locus of Their Truth, 
Synthese.
Nagel, Ernest (1961), The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World.
Quine, William v. O. (1951), “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, The Philosophical 
Review 60.
Railton, Peter (1981), “Probability, Explanation and Information”, Synthese 
48: 233-256.
Salmon, Wesley (1984), Scientifi c Explanation and the Causal Structure of the 
World, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Schelling, T. C. (1978), Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.
Simon, Herbert (1957), Models of Man: Social and Rational; Mathematical Essays 
on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley.
Sober, Elliott (1983), “Equilibrium Explanation”, Philosophical Studies 43: 
201-210.
Suárez, Mauricio (1999), “Theories, Models, and Representations”, in 
Lorenzo Magnani, Nancy J. Nersessian and Paul Thagard (eds.), Model-
Based Reasoning in Scientifi c Discovery. New York: Kluwer, 75-83. 
Suárez, Mauricio (2003), “Scientifi c representation: Against similarity and 
isomorphism”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17: 225–
244.
Suárez, Mauricio (2004), “An inferential conception of scientifi c 
representation”, Philosophy of Science (Symposia) 71: 767–779.
Sugden, Robert (2002), “Credible worlds: The status of the theoretical models 
in economics”, in Uskali Mäki (Ed.), Fact and fi ction in economics: Models, 
realism, and social construction, pp. 107–136. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Suppe, Frederick (ed.) (1977), The Structure of Scientifi c Theories, Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press.
Suppe, Frederick (1989), The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientifi c 
Realism. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
Suppes, Patrick (1960), “A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models 
in Mathematics and the Empirical Sciences”, Synthèse 12: 287-301.
Suppes, Patrick (1962), “Models of data”, in E. Nagel, P. Suppes, & A. Tarski 
(Eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 
International Congress. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 252-261.
van Fraassen, Bas C. (1980), The Scientifi c Image. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Vorms, Marion (2009), “Formats of Representation in Scientifi c Theorising”, 
in PhilSci Archive: [2009] Models and Simulations 3 (Charlottesville, 
Virginia; March 5-7, 2009): http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/
archive/00003901/
Weisberg, Michael (2007), “Who is a Modeler”, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 58, 207-233.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953) [1997], Philosophical Investigations (translated 
by G. E. M. Anscombe) Oxford : Blackwell.
Jaakko Kuorikoski
49
Woodward, James (2003), Making Things Happen, Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Ylikoski, Petri (2001), Understanding Interests and Causal Explanation. Ph.D. 
thesis, [http://ethesis.helsinki.fi /julkaisut/val/kayta/vk/ylikoski/]
Ylikoski, Petri (2009), “Illusions in Scientifi c Understanding”, In De Regt, 
Leonelli & Eigner  (eds.) Scientifi c Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives, 
Pittsburgh University Press.
Ylikoski, Petri and Jaakko Kuorikoski (2008), “Intentional Fundamentalism”, 
in. Hieke, A. and H. Leitgeb (eds.): Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy 
and the Sciences - Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium, 
Vol XVI, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria: Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein 
Society, 405-407.
Society by Numbers

